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CASENOTES
Rule of Reason, Per Se Rule, and Professional Groups: National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States '—In 1972, the United States brought a civil
antitrust action against the National Society of Professional Engineers, a pro-
fessional group comprising approximately 69,000 of the 325,000 registered
professional engineers in the United States. 2 The Government alleged that
members of the Society had agreed to abide by a canon of ethics which
prohibited the submission of competitive bids for engineering services. 3 The
Government further maintained that, as a consequence of the canon, price
competition was suppressed among members of the Society contrary to section
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' Admitting the essential facts of the Gov-
ernment's complaint, the defendant Society interposed the affirmative defense
that the canon should be sustained under the Rule of Reason because price
cotnpetition among professional engineers is harmful to the public and to the
profession.* The Society averred that because each rendition of engineering
services is unique, competitive bidding on most projects before the future
services are fully planned is inherently deceptive and fraudulent. As such,
competitive bidding could result in structures whose design endangers life
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
2
 Id. at 681 -82.
3 Id. at 683 n.3, citing the National Society of Professional Engineers Code of
Ethics. § 11(c). Section 11(c) provides:
Section 11—The Engineer will not compete unfairly with another engineer
by attempting to obtain employment or advancement or professional en-
gagements by competitive bidding....
c. He shall not solicit or submit engineering proposals on the basis of
competitive bidding. Competitive bidding for professional engineering
services is defined as the formal or informal submission, or receipt, or ver-
bal or written estimates of cost or proposals in terms of dollars, man days
of work required, percentage of construction cost, or any other measure of
compensation whereby the prospective client may compare engineering
services on a price basis prior to the time that one engineer, or one en-
gineering organization, has been selected for negotiations. The disclosure
of recommended fee schedules prepared by various engineering societies is
not considered to constitute competitive bidding. An Engineer requested to
submit a fee proposal or bid prior to the selection of an engineer or firm
subject to the negotiation of a satisfactory contract, shall attempt to have
the procedure changed to conform to ethical practices, but if not successful
he shall withdraw from consideration for the proposed work. These prin-
ciples shall be applied by the Engineer in obtaining the services of other
professionals.
United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Engineers, 389 F. Supp.
1193, 1195, 1197 (D.D.C. 1974). Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976),
provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
5 435 U.S. at 684-85. Brief for Petitioner at 27, National Soc'y of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). The Society argued that selection of
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and safety. The Society further claimed that competitive bidding is the least
efficient method of procuring professional engineering services. 6
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that
the ban was a per se violation of the Act, and refused to analyze the Society's
Rule of Reason justification for the canon.' On the.basis of findings of fact
concerning the history of the ban on competitive bidding, its scope, and the
Society's enforcement mechanisms, the district court held that the ethical
canon was "on its face a tampering with the price structure of engineering
fees in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act." On direct appeal, 9 the
Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision, and remanded the case
for further consideration in light of its recent decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar."
On remand, the district court found Goldfarb supportive of its use of a
per se standard of review and, accordingly, reaffirmed its decision." In re-
viewing Goldfarb, which held that the learned professions do not enjoy an
exemption from the antitrust laws," the district court identified three factors
that led the Supreme Court to find a bar association's mandatory minimum
fee schedule to be unlawful price-fixing: the nature of the restraint of trade,
its enforcement by the professional association, and its adverse impact on con-
sumers." Turning to the Society's ethical canon, the district court stressed
that the ban was not an advisory measure, but was in fact an absolute prohibi-
tion of price competition. The district court further noted that Canon 11(c)
was actively enforced by the Society, and that it had an adverse impact on
consumers. The impact was significant because professional engineering serv-
ices are essential to nearly every construction project.' 4 The Society neverthe-
an engineer by competence rather than bidding is in the public interest and reasonable
because:
(A) Bidding in engineering endangers life and safety;
(B) Bidding in engineering suppresses the free exchange of information
necessary to the profession;
(C) Bidding in engineering frustrates and prevents competition in con-
struction;
(D) Selection by competence tends to decrease, and bidding tends to in-
crease, construction, maintenance, operating, and life-cycle costs;
(E) Selection by competence is the best way to secure optimum design, and
bidding leads to functional inefficiency; and
(F) In engineering, bidding is inherently deceptive and fraudulent.
6
 434 U.S. at 685 n.7.
7 United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Engineers, 389 F. Supp.
1193, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974).
8 Id. at 1200.
9 422 U.S. 1031 (1975). The direct appeal was made pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
*329 (1970), which was amended on December 29, 1974 to provide for initial review
in the courts of appeal in most cases. 15 U.S.C. § 29(a) (1976).
" 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Goldfarb was decided during the same Term as the
direct appeal.
" 404 F. Supp. 457, 460-61 (D.D.C. 1975).
' 2 421 U.S. at 787.
13 404 F. Supp. at 460.
14 Id.
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less claimed that Goldfarb stands for the proposition that Rule of Reason
analysis, rather than per se rule analysis, is required when professional ac-
tivities or a professional code of ethics is at issue. This contention was flatly
rejected by the district court. In the court's view, such a construction of
Goldfarb would in large measure revive the learned profession exemption
which the Goldfarb Court had negated." The district court observed that
Goldfarb did not use the Rule of Reason standard but applied the per se stan-
dard to its determination of price-fixing. Accordingly, the district court con-
cluded that price-fixing "receives no privileged treatment when incorporated
into a code of ethics."" On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' s to determine whether a profes-
sional group's canon of ethics which inhibits price competition in the provi-
sion of professional services can be justified as a reasonable restraint of trade
because it was adopted to protect the public from deceptive bidding and sub-
standard work." In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, joined by four
justices, 2° the Court HELD: An ethical canon forbidding the discussion of
prices with potential clients until one member of the professional group is
selected for work on its face violates section 1 of the Sherman Act." The
Court further held that a defense based on the assumption that competition is
harmful to public safety cannot be justified under the Rule of Reason."
The significance of Professional Engineers lies in the Court's reassertion of
the limits of the Rule of Reason and in the imposition of these limits upon the
learned professions. The Court refused to provide an anti-trust exemption for
professionals by approving a broader definition of "reasonableness" than cur-
rently exists for nonprofessional commerce. Nevertheless, the Court acknowl-
16
 Id. at 461.
16 Id.
" 555 F.2d 978, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In holding that firm remedial action
was warranted, the court of appeals stated that the case presented a program of "all-
out interdiction of price information for the client who has not selected its engineer."
Id. at 983. The court nevertheless indicated that the Society could move the district
court for a modification of its decree if the Society adopted a canon more tailored to
the legitimate objective of preventing deceptively low bids. Id. The court of appeals
modified the judgment with respect to that part of the injunction ordering the Society
to publish in its journal and ethical opinions that competitive bidding is an ethical
practice for an engineer. The court determined that such a remedy was more intrusive
than necessary to fulfill the government's interest in eradicating the violation. Id. at
984.
's 434 U.S. 815 (1977).
19 Id. at 681.
2° Id. at 680. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred in the judgment,
joining in Part I of the opinion, which recited•the facts, and Part III, which upheld the
remedial order as modified by the court of appeals. Id. at 699-701. The Chief Justice
concurred in the Court's finding of a Sherman Act violation, but dissented from the
remedy on first amendment grounds. Id. at 701. Justice Brennan took no part in the
decision.
21 Id. at 692.
22 Id. at 696.
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edged the need to consider professional concerns by recognizing that the
form of professional competition is apt to vary from ordinary business com-
petition. Despite this recognition, the factors which the lower courts will apply
to distinguish professional competition from ordinary business competition
remain unclear.
After a brief review of the Court's reasoning in Professional Engineers, this
casenote will survey the historical background and development of both the
Rule of Reason and the per se doctrine under the Sherman Act. Next, the
evolution of the learned profession exemption will be traced through to its
demise in Goldfarb. In assessing the Court's analysis in Professional Engineers,
particular attention will be devoted to the Court's refusal to recreate the
learned profession exemption and to the Court's restatement of the Rule of
Reason with regard to all antitrust litigants. Because the Court did not define
the difference between the "business aspects" of a profession and its inher-
ently "professional aspects," the former being subject to the strictures of the
antitrust laws, a model will be suggested for isolating the two. Finally, the state
action doctrine will be noted briefly in light of its importance in analyzing
professional restraints of trade.
I. THE COURT'S REASONING IN PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS
The Supreme Court framed the issue before it as whether a canon of
ethics can be justified under the Sherman Act merely because members of a
learned profession believe it will minimize the risk of professional competition
leading to work endangering the public safety." The Court commenced its
analysis of this issue with a close examination of the nature of the engineering
profession, the training of professional engineers, the effect of their work on
the economy, and the methods by which the members compute their fees.
The Court then turned to its 1975 Goldfarb decision, where the Court inti-
mated that certain professional practices might be upheld under the Rule of
Reason even though they might be considered unlawful if engaged in by
nonprofessionals. In this connection, the Court noted that the petitioner Soci-
ety had placed great reliance on a footnote to the Goldfarb opinion,24 as well
as the major Rule of Reason cases." The Society used this authority to con-
2 3 Id. at 681.
" 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17. The Goldfarb Court noted:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particu-
lar restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the
practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and
automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which origi-
nated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be
viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated
differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the one with
which we are confronted today.
" E.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds, I P. Wms. 181, 1 All Eng. Reprints [1558-17741
26 (Q.B. 1711); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Chicago Bd. of
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tend that its attempt to preserve the traditional fee setting method was a
reasonable means of protecting the public from harmful, unrestrained com-
petitive bidding by professional engineers. To evaluate this contention, the
Court felt compelled to reexamine the contours of the Rule of Reason."
The Court began its examination of the Rule with the observation that
the language of the Sherman Act proscribing "every" contract which restrains
trade cannot be taken literally. 27
 In particular, the Court noted that Con-
gress expected the courts to give shape to the Act by drawing on common law
principles." The Court stated that the Rule of Reason, with its genesis in the
common law, has fulfilled this function. Nevertheless, the Court cautioned
that the Rule does not justify restraints of trade merely because they may fall
within the realm of reason." Rather, the Rule looks directly to a challenged
restraint's impact on competitive conditions. To demonstrate the Rule's limits,
the Court restated the well-settled principle that neither the reasonableness of
prices set by private agreement 3° nor the contention that monopolistic ar-
rangements in a particular industry may better serve the public 3 ' are pro-
tected by the Rule of Reason. Accordingly, the Court directed those who
would advance such argument to address them to Congress as the proper
institution to grant any exemption from the Act for specific industries. 32
Following this discussion of the Rule's parameters, the Court set out the
test established in Standard Oil Co. v. United States," which is typically used to
determine whether a challenged restraint unreasonably restricts competitive
conditions. Under this test, unreasonableness is determined either (1) by the
nature or character of the contracts, or (2) by surrounding circumstances
which evince a purpose or intent to restrain trade and enhance prices." The
Court emphasized that under either branch of the Standard Oil test the focus
is only on the restraint's impact on competitive conditions." The Court
further identified the first branch of the test as relevant to agreements that
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
28 435 U.S. at 687.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 687-88 (citing remarks of Senator Sherman, 21 CONG. REC. 2456
(March 21, 1890)).
29 Id. at 688.
n
 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir.
1898).
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 339 (1897);
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 573-77 (1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1898).
32 435 U.S. at 689-90.
n 221 U.S. I (1911).
34
 435 U.S. at 691; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. at 58.
35 Id. at 690. The Court followed this with an explanation of the test provided
by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In
Chicago Bd. of Trade, Justice Brandeis looked for either a promotion or a suppression
of competition by the restraint, while taking into account the possibility that some
restraints, while regulating competition, may thereby actually promote it. Id. at 238.
The Court in Professional Engineers adopted this approach. 435 U.S. at 691.8
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are plainly anticompetitive—illegal per se. The second and complementary
branch of analysis was identified as involving agreements whose competitive
impact can only be determined by a more searching inquiry that takes account
of the peculiar nature of the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons for its imposition. 36
Applying this analysis to the Society's ban on competitive bidding, the
Court had little difficulty in finding the ethical canon facially invalid under
the Sherman Act. Noting that any agreement which interferes with the setting
of prices by free market forces is illegal on its face," the Court viewed Canon
11(c) as an agreement among competitors to refrain from discussing prices
with potential customers. While the Court would not attach the label of direct
price-fixing to the ban, 38 it did find it to be a price interference mechanism.
Thus, the Court ruled out an elaborate industry analysis under the Rule of
Reason. Since the bidding ban was absolute, in that it applied with equal force
to both complicated and simple projects and failed to discriminate between
inexperienced and sophisticated customers, the Court readily discovered an
anticompetitive purpose behind the canon. Borrowing from the language of
the district court," the Court stated that Canon 1 1(c) impedes the ordinary
workings of the marketplace and deprives customers of the ability to compare
prices when seeking engineering services." Although the Court was willing
to assume, for the purpose of argument, that competitive bidding in the en-
gineering context might force prices down, lead to inferior work, and, in
some instances, be inherently imprecise, the Court refused to allow these con-
siderations to justify the Society's ban under the Rule of Reason. The Court
observed that a purchaser might reasonably conclude that quality concerns
outweigh price advantages gained through seeking competitive bids and that
an individual vendor might be reasonable if he independently refrained from
submitting any price information until he has familiarized himself with the
client's needs. 4 ' These considerations would not, however, authorize vendors
of engineering services to impose noncompetitive pricing on all purchasers.
In thus refusing to sustain the canon under the Rule of Reason, the
Court bluntly stated that the Society's action in imposing its views on the costs
and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace was "a frontal assault
" Id. at 692.
37 Id. (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226, n.59
(1940)).
38 Id.
39 404 F. Supp. at 460.
4° 435 U.S. at 692-93.
41 Id. at 694. In this regard, the Court briefly referred to the Brooks Act, 40
U.S.C. §§ 541-544 (1976). This Act provides a method of engineer selection for certain
federal contracts that is similar to the "traditional method" of selection embodied in
Canon 11(c). Id. The Court cautioned that the Brooks Act cannot be read to create an
antitrust exempt for engineering services and amounts to nothing more than a deci-
sion by one purchaser not to seek price competition through competitive bidding. The
Court declared that the Brooks Act does not authorize vendors of engineering services
to impose this determination on all other purchasers. 435 U.S. at 694-95 n.21.
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on the basic policy of the Sherman Act." 42 The Court identified this policy
as a legislative judgment in favor of competition that precludes judicial in-
quiry into whether competition is good or bad.'" Therefore, the Court re-
fused to consider the profession's involvement in large-scale projects which
significantly affect public safety as a factor in favor of its competitive ban. The
Court reasoned that with the vast number of potentially dangerous goods and
services in an economy such as ours, any exemptions to the Sherman Act
granted on this basis would be equivalent to a repeal of the statute."
The Court concluded its opinion by clarifying the significance of the
footnote in Goldfarb which suggested that antitrust concepts developed in
other contexts would not be automatically applied to the professions." It
flatly declared that this recognition is not to be read as carving out a broad
learned profession exemption through the Rule of Reason. While still adher-
ing to the Goldfarb view that the nature of professional competition may vary
from ordinary business competition, the Court asserted that only those ethical
norms which serve to promote professional competition would fall within the
Rule's protection." Thus, the Court stated that although problems of profes-
sional deception are a proper subject for an ethical canon, any canon which
equates competition with deception and safety hazards is too broad."
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the Court's
judgment," but was reluctant to wholly approve the opinion. He perceived
the Court's holding to be that a professional group's ethical rule with an over-
all anticompetitive effect is necessarily violative of the Sherman Act. Justice
Blackmun felt it was unnecessary for the Court to pass on the Rule of Reason
in this case. Rather, he stressed that Canon 11(c) could be held overbroad for
two reasons. First, the "forced process of sequential search" by a client seeking
price information, due to the operation of the canon, inevitably discourages
price competition without possessing the redeeming feature of preventing the
submission of uninformed bids by engineers. Second, Justice Blackmun found
the canon overbroad because it prevents engineers from releasing any price
information regardless of the extent of the need to protect the purchaser
from imprecise bids." Having thus concluded that the Court's Rule of
Reason analysis was unnecessary, Justice Blackmun expressed concern that es-
sential ethical rules would be held invalid under the Court's reasoning. In
particular, Justice Blackmun feared that the majority opinion did not allow
enough "elbow room" for a realistic application of the Sherman Act to profes-
sional activities. 5 °
42 435 U.S. at 695.
43 Id.
" Id.
45 See note 24 supra.
46 435 U.S. at 696.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 699.
4s
	
at 699-700.
5° Id. at 700-01.
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II. CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR EVALUATING
PROFESSIONAL ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
From the inception of the Sherman Act in 1890 until the very recent
past, activities of professional groups were thought to be outside the operation
of the antitrust laws. The professions were left to state and self-regulation.
Not until the 1975 Goldfarb decision did the Supreme Court squarely hold
that professional groups enjoy no exemption from the antitrust laws. In the
aftermath of Goldfarb, the Supreme Court is undergoing a period of develop-
ing the parameters of the newly recognized subjection of the learned profes-
sions to antitrust laws. Professional Engineers is only the second Supreme Court
decision construing how professional activities are to be tested when chal-
lenged under the antitrust laws. A brief examination of the evolution of the
Rule of Reason, the per se doctrine, and the previous learned profession
exemption will provide a backdrop for assessing this decision.
A. Doctrinal Underpinnings of the Sherman Act
A proper understanding of the Sherman Antitrust Act requires that it be
viewed as aimed not so much against "trusts" as against restraints of trade. At
common law, contracts in general restraint of trade were considered contrary
to public policy, and hence unlawful and void, while agreements which par-
tially restrained trade were valid if the restraint was lawful, the consideration
adequate, and the restriction reasonable." Mitchel v. Reynolds, 52
 which the
Professional Engineers Court identified and discussed as the genesis of the Rule
of Reason," held that a general restraint—an agreement not to compete
throughout the kingdom for an unlimited time—was invalid because it was
injurious to the individual whose livelihood was lost, and to the public at large
which was denied the services of a useful member." In time, the nature of
the injury to the public assumed primary importance, and the term "general
restraint of trade" evolved to "unreasonable restraint of trade." In Mitchel,
Chief Justice Parke condemned general restraints because, among other
reasons, of "the great abuses these voluntary restraints are liable to, as for
instance, from corporations who are perpetually labouring for exclusive ad-
vantages in trade and to reduce it into as few hands as possible."'
The cynical view of corporate power expressed in Mitchel became even
more prevalent during the nineteenth century. With the rise of trusts after
1880, led by the Standard Oil Company's near monopolization of the domes-
tic oil industry, public alarm increased and provided the impetus for the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. At that time it was widely felt that the im-
pingement of competition by the great economic concentrations in railroads
and manufacturing was a problem of national scope and beyond the ability of
•
" Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 349 (1875). Cf. Central Ohio Salt Co. v.
Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 672 (1880).
52 1 P. Wms. 181, 1 All Eng. Reprints [1558-1774] 26 (Q.B. 1711).
53 435 U.S. at 688.
" 1 P. Wms. 181, 
	  1 All Eng. Reprints [1558-1774) at 30-31.
" Id. at	 1 All Eng. Reprints [1558-1774] at 30.
724	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 20:716
the states individually to control. The Sherman Act was enacted to correct this
situation." The Act did not announce novel principles of law; it merely en-
abled the federal courts to apply well-settled common law principles to re-
straints formerly regulated by state law. In this way, Congress intended to
help the states control combinations in restraint of trade. 57 The interpreta-
tion of this statute, which proscribes "[e]very contract, combination . .. or
conspiracy in restraint of trade,"" eventually gave rise to two distinct but
related methods of evaluating alleged restraints of trade—the Rule of Reason
and the per se rule.
B. Origins and Development of the
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Rule
At an early date, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress intended
the Sherman Act to be given life through the common law definition of
reasonableness. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States," Chief Justice White set
forth the principle that reasonableness was to be the guideline in interpreting
the Act." The application of this standard became known as the Rule of
Reason. The Rule was given further shape seven years later by Justice Bran-
deis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United Stales." In that case, a rule of the
Board of Trade of Chicago prohibited its members from purchasing grain "to
arrive" from outside Chicago between the close of the Board and the opening
of business the next day for any price but that set at the close of bidding."
The Government alleged that this price-fixing activity constituted a violation
of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court rejected this allegation as a "bald
proposition" and declined to equate any activity which restrains competition
with a violation of the Sherman Act by "so simple a test." 63 Rather, a re-
straint which "merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition" is
legitimate, as opposed to one which is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition." 64
53 III AMERICAN LANDMARK LEGISLATION 5-14 (I. Sloan ed. 1976).
57 As stated by its sponsor, Senator Sherman:
It [the bill] does not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and
well-recognized principles of the common law to the complicated jurisdic-
tion of our State and Federal Governments. Similar contracts in any State
in the Union are now, by common or statute law, null and void.
This bill, as 1 would have it, has for its single object to invoke the
aid of the courts of the United States to deal with the combinations de-
scribed in the first section....
21 Cong. Rec. 2456-57 (March 21, 1890)(rernarks of Senator Sherman). See also cases
cited by Senator Sherman, Id. at 2457-59.
58 See note 4 supra.
5b
	
U.S. 1 (1911).
6 ° Id. at 60.
61 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
62 Id. at 236-37.
63
 Id. at 238.
s.
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In order to classify this restraint, the Chicago Board of Trade Court ruled
that "the courts must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied ...." 65 This in turn requires a study of the
business before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the re-
straint, and its actual or probable effect. The intent behind the restraint is
relevant, but the Court warned that good intent will not save an unreasonable
restraint. Rather, intent is ascertained merely to•assist the trial court in reach-
ing an understanding of all the facts." Applying the Standard Oil test to the
Board of Trade call rule, the restraint was deemed reasonable because it was
to operate for a limited time only, applied only to a small part of the grain
coming to Chicago, and had the competitive benefit of facilitating market
penetration by outside dealers. Additionally, the call rule was seen to make
the market more competitive by encouraging members to bid openly during
the business day. 67
While the Chicago Board of Trade test stands as the classic statement of the
Rule of Reason, certain language from the opinion has engendered consider-
able difficulty by unnecessarily increasing the length and complexity of anti-
trust defenses. The statement in Chicago Board of Trade that trial courts must
ordinarily make a detailed study of a defendant's industry to gauge the impact
of a practice on competition 68
 has been used by defendants to promote fruit-
less inquiries. These inquiries to ferret out reasonableness add nothing to the
trier of fact's understanding of the practice and instead invoke exotic stan-
dards of reasonableness." While the Court recently has stated that Rule of
Reason analysis is the general rule," and thus the in-depth inquiry of Chicago
Board of Trade is generally proper, it must not be forgotten that inquiry into
" Id.
" Id.
67 Id. at 239-41.
6a
	 at 238 (emphasis added).
6s
	 e.g., Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), wherein
retaliatory methods by means of a concerted boycott and private tribunal and en-
forcement mechanisms were advocated as a reasonable means to prevent competitors
from pirating clothing designs. Cf. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958), wherein per se rules of illegality were approved by the Court as obviating "the
necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at
large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry so often wholly
fruitless when undertaken." Id. at 5. Northern Pacific was quoted with approval by the
Court in United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). There the Court, per
Justice Marshall, recognized that "courts are of limited utility in examining difficult
economic problems." Id. at 609. The Rule of Reason was seen by the Court as causing
courts "to ramble through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible
approach." Id. at 609-10 n.10. No less a supporter of the rule than Professor Handler
has had occasion to observe that "there was a dangerous breadth to the rule of
reason ... which had the tendency of making each case a law unto itself, vastly increas-
ing the difficulties of enforcing the antitrust laws." Study of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings
on S. Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. Vol. I, 36 (1955).
7° Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 49.
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reasonableness is narrow in that it is only seeking to bring to light the com-
petitive impact of the challenged restraint."
Coexistent with the Rule of Reason in antitrust analysis is the per se rule
of illegality. Like the Rule of Reason, the per se doctrine is used to identify a
deleterous competitive impact when passing on the unreasonableness of a
trade restraint. Unlike the Rule of Reason, however, the per se analysis does
not require an extended probe into the nature of the defendant's industry to
find unreasonableness. Rather, the per se rule rests on a conclusive presump-
tion, based on prior judicial experience, that certain enumerated practices are
inherently unreasonable. Among these proscribed practices are price-fixing, 72
group boycotts," and territorial limitations on competition.'" If the chal-
lenged practice cannot readily be shown to possess a plain anticompetitive
purpose and effect, then it does not fall into the per se category; the Rule of
Reason is then utilized. If, however, a practice is found to be a per se viola-
tion, there is no need to analyze the impact which the practice has on
competition within the industry. The Rule of Reason cannot be invoked to
rescue the restraint and the court's inquiry is ended.
While the per se rule has its roots in the earliest Supreme Court antitrust
cases, 75 it was not until United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 76 decided nine
years after Chicago Board of Trade, that the Court came to conclusively pre-
sume a practice unlawful in all circumstances and not on a case-by-case basis.
The defendants in Trenton Potteries controlled eighty-two percent of the man-
ufacture and distribution of ceramic bathroom fixtures and combined to fix
their prices. The trial court refused to give the jury certain charges, some of
which were drawn from language of Chicago Board of Trade." The defend-
ants had requested that the jury be charged that it must find that the fixed
prices unreasonably restrained interstate commerce before it could return a
guilty verdict. After reviewing prior judicial experience with price-fixing," the
Supreme Court in Trenton Potteries ruled that the trial court did not commit
error when it charged that price-fixing is an unreasonable restraint of trade as
a matter of law." The Court noted that every price-fixing agreement aims at
the elimination of one form of competition. Reasonableness of the fixed
prices is immaterial because the power to fix reasonable prices is the power to
71 Id.
72 United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 218.
73 Fashion Originators Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1940).
' United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
75
 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
7 273 U.S. 392, 397-401 (1927).
" Id, at 395.
75 Id. at 397. This review included the cases of United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505
(1898); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Dr. Miles Mtdical Co. v.
Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
79 273 U.S. at 395-96.
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fix unreasonable ones. Rather, the Court observed "[t]he reasonable price
fixed today may through economic and business changes become the un-
reasonable price of tomorrow." "
The Court in Trenton Potteries distinguished Chicago Board of Trade as up-
holding a price for only part of each day that had been "determined by open
competition on the floor of the Exchange." " Furthermore, since regulation
of a Board of Trade was involved, the Court held that Chicago Board of Trade
did not sanction price agreements among competitors in an open market. 82
The Court then referred to the requested charges that were drawn from the
language of Chicago Board of Trade. The Court agreed that they were correct
"as a general abstraction," but stated that they were "inapplicable to the case
in hand and rightly refused."" The Trenton Potteries Court thus ruled that an
elaborate industry examination to determine reasonableness, as set out by
Chicago Board of Trade, is not universally required in litigation under section 1
of the Act, and that an agreement to fix prices is an instance which is conclu-
sively presumed to be unlawful.
The per se rule as applied to price-fixing was expanded by the Court in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co." Socony-Vacuum firmly established that
any agreement which is intended to manipulate prices, and not merely overt
price-fixing, is illegal per se. The defendants in that action were convicted of
conspiring to raise gasoline prices by buying up and removing from the mar-
ket "distress gasoline" which exerted a downward pressure on prices."
Employing the term "per se" for the first time, the Court, through Justice
Douglas, held that "a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect
of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stablizing the price of a commodity
in interstate commerce is illegal per se.' The Court refused to consider
whether price-fixing might be a reasonable way to correct competitive
abuses." It stated that Congress "has not permitted the age-old cry of ruin-
ous competition and competitive evils to be a defense to price-fixing con-
spiracies."" Thus, the Socony-Vacuum Court expressly precluded Rule of
80 Id. at 397.
81 Id.
" Id. at 401.
83 Id.
84 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
" Id. at 167-68.
86 Id. at 223.
87 In the depression era decision of Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 (1933), the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from the per se rule of
Trenton Potteries. In Appalachian Coals, the defendants' industry was regarded as being
so highly competitive as to be unhealthy. The Court approved the defendants' creation
of a single marketing agency to stabilize the industry as a reasonable means of foster-
ing "fair competitive opportunities" to promote competition on a sounder basis. Id. at
372-74. Thus, the Court upheld price sustaining mechanisms under the Rule of
Reason. Id., at 377-78. Whether Appalachian Coals rested in part upon shaken faith in
the virtues of unrestrained competition can only be speculated. See also L. Suu.tvAN,
ANTITRUST 179-82 (1977). The matter of price-fixing and gradations thereof was fi-
nally put to rest by the Socony- Vacuum Court.
" 310 U.S. at 221.
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Reason analysis, holding that price-fixing agreements are conclusively pre-
sumed unreasonable and hence incapable of legal justification. 89
 This is so,
the Court ruled, because of their actual or potential threat to the economic
system. 9° Even though the means employed by the respondents were similar
to objectives of the National Industrial Recovery Act," which granted anti-
trust immunity in certain instances, this did not shield them from prosecution.
Neither, the Court noted, did the fact that certain government officials may
have known and tacitly approved of the activities. As to the first matter, the
respondents did not receive National Recovery Administration approval for
their scheme and they were thus outside the protection of the statute. In any
event, the Court declared that although evidence of similarity with gov-
ernmental objectives and tacit approval by some government officials may
have bearing in a Rule of Reason case, it has none in a per se case."
The standard for identifying activities as illegal per se 93 was set out by
the Court in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States." The Court held that "be-
cause of- [the] pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue" of certain agreements or practices, they are "conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the pre-
cise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."" The
justifications for the per se rule of illegality are, as the Northern Pacific Court
noted, certainty of law and judicial economy." While the per se rule may be
the exceptional application and the Rule of Reason the general rule, the
Northern Pacific standard still has great vitality whenever a per se violation is
shown. 97
C. The Demise of the Learned Profession Exemption: Goldfarb
Prior to the 1975 Goldfarb decision, it was widely believed that the learned
professions were exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws" and, ac-
cordingly, that the professions were unaffected by either the Rule of Reason
or the per se doctrine. This assumption rested on statutory construction and
policy arguments. Under the former thesis, the professions were outside the
scope of the Sherman Act because the rendering of professional services was
not trade or commerce, and hence not regulated by the Act. 99 In addition,
99 Id. at 224-26 n.59.
9° Id.
91
 Ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (enacted June 16, 1933, expired June 16,
1935).
92
 310 U.S. at 227-28.
93 See text at notes 72-74 supra.
91 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
95 Id. at 5.
96 Id.
97
 See Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50.
" See Joseph P. Bauer, Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE.
DAME LAWYER 570, 571-92 (1975). See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1,
13-15 (4th Cir.1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
99 Bauer, supra, note 98, at 573-79.
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professional services were essentially local in nature, and thus not a matter of
interstate commerce.'°° In contrast, the policy-based thesis held that profes-
sional ideals and values were inconsistent with the competitive values which
the Sherman Act espoused, and that the professions were already subject to
state regulation. Thus, the learned professions were considered to be beyond
the reach of federal antitrust regulation."'
The profession-trade dichotomy was supported by dicta in several early
cases, 102 but little else. The genesis of the judicial distinction was a statement
by Justice Story in a case involving fishermen. 103 He maintained that
"[w]henever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the
purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned
professions, it is constantly called a trade."'" In Federal Baseball Club v. Na-
tional League, 10 ' Justice Holmes offered by way of further illustration that "a
firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a case, or the Chautauqua
lecture bureau sending out lecturers, does not engage in [interstate] com-
merce because the lawyer or lecturer goes to another State."'" These cases
did not determine that Congress intended the professions to be exempt from
the Act, but rather applied now outmoded standards of "trade" and "in-
terstate commerce" to find an exemption.
The question whether the professions are exempt from the operation of
the antitrust laws was squarely faced and decided by a unanimous Court in
Goldfarb.'" At issue was a lawyers' minimum fee promulgated by the Fairfax
County Bar Association of Virginia. The Goldfarb Court was required to de-
cide whether the minimum fee schedule amounted to price-fixing. If it did
find price-fixing, the Court then was required to determine whether the ac-
tivities of the bar association were exempt from the Sherman Act because they
did not affect interstate commerce or because of a learned profession exemp-
tion. In deciding that the minimum fee schedule amounted to price-fixing,
the Court emphasized that it was not passing upon an advisory fee schedule,
but rather a rigid price floor for legal services.'" This rigidity was man-
ifested by the refusal of the attorneys contacted by the petitioner to deviate
from the minimum fee and by the consistent enforcement of the schedule.'° 9
The Court readily found that the fee schedule had an effect on interstate
commerce, even though the title search sought by petitioners was to be per-
too Id. at 5 7 1.
t°' Id.
102 See The Schooner Nymph, 18 F. Cases 506, 507 (C.C.D. Me. 1834); Atlantic
Cleaners and Dyers Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932); FTC v. Raladam
Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931).
1 " The Schooner Nymph, 18 F. Cases 506 (C.C.D. Me. 1834).
104
	 at 507 (emphasis added).
1 " 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
1 " Id. at 209.
1 p 1 421 U.S. at 774. The Court ruled 8-0 against the restraint. Justice Powell,
who is a past president of the Virginia Bar Association, absented himself from consid-
eration of the case.
1 " Id. at 781.
1" Id.
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formed wholly within the State of Virginia, because substantial funds to fi-
nance real estate purchases in Fairfax County came from outside the state,
and these interstate transactions were wholly dependent on title searches."°
Turning to the question of a learned profession exemption, the Court
could not find that Congress intended the professions to enjoy a "sweeping
exclusion" from the Sherman Act since the language of section 1 is broad and
since there is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions to the Act."'
The Court determined that a title examination for money is " 'commerce' in
the most common usage of that word," 112
 and that it was not disparaging the
practice of law as a profession by acknowledging such a business aspect"'
The Court indicated in an accompanying footnote that conventional antitrust
concepts would not be automatically applied to the professions. The Court
stated that some practices which would be viewed as violative of the Sherman
Act in another context might be treated differently where one of the learned
professions was involved."' It was precisely this question which was at issue
in Professional Engineers—whether the Rule of Reason, in its present form, will
be automatically applied to restraints of trade embodied in the rules and regu-
lations adopted by and governing professional associations.
III. AN
 ASSESSMENT OF THE COURT'S
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS IN PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS
A. The Refusal to Revive a Learned Professions Exemption
Taking heart from the dictum in Goldfarb that it would be "unrealistic to
... automatically apply to the professions antitrust concepts which arose in
other areas," 115 the petitioner in Professional Engineers argued that the rigid
per se rule has no place in a challenge to a professional group's code of
ethics. Since Canon 11(c) lay at the heart of the engineering profession's ef-
forts to promote ethical conduct in dealings with nonprofessionals, the Society
contended that the canon must be evaluated under the Rule of Reason."°
The Society further urged that when passing on the reasonableness of a pro-
fessional ethical regulation, the Rule's inquiry, to be realistic, must entail con-
siderations of public health and safety and professional ethical conduct." 7
The Supreme Court utterly rejected the contentions advanced •by the
Society, and proceeded to analyze the alleged restraint under the per se rule.
While the district court on remand found the ethical proscription to be a
"classic illustration of price-fixing in the Goldfarb mold," 118 the Court was un-
110 Id. at 783-85.
111 Id. at 787.
'" Id at 787-88.
" 3 Id. at 788.
114 Id. at 788 n.17. See note 26 supra.
"5 See note 26 supra.
116
 Brief for Petitioner at 56-57, National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States. For text of Canon 11(c), see note 3 supra.
" 7 Id. at 57.
118
 404 F. Supp. at 460.
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willing to make that equation. Even though it would not term the ban direct
price-fixing,"° the Court had no difficulty divining the anticompetitive
character of the canon without the aid of extended Rule of Reason
analysis."° The Court viewed the agreement embodied by Canon 11(c) as a
refusal to discuss prices with potential customers until after the initial tentative
selection of an engineer. Thus, in the Court's view, the Canon operated as a
complete ban on competitive bidding."' In reaching this conclusion, the
Court attached weight to the ban's equal application to complicated and
routine projects, and to inexperienced and sophisticated customers. As such,
the ban represented a blanket approach."' In a similar vein, the Goldfarb
Court attached weight to the all-embracing nature of the lawyers' minimum
fee schedule which created a pricing system consumers could not readily
avoid.' 23
The Court's use of this evidence should not be interpreted as meaning
that a higher standard of proof is involved when a professional restraint of
trade is at issue. The Goldfarb Court expressly noted that no specific mag-
nitude of restraint need be proved if an adverse effect on interstate commerce
is showu.'" Rather, it appears that where a defense is premised on a claim
of professional ethics, then a demonstration of the magnitude of the restraint
is useful in showing that it actually rests on an anticompetitive purpose and
effect. In other words, evidence of magnitude is helpful in penetrating an
ethical facade to find a naked restraint of trade. Neither should the failure of
the Court to employ the term "per se" in both Professional Engineers and
Goldfarb be read as a dilution of that form of analysis in a professional con-
text. Indeed, in Professional Engineers the Court affirmatively held that Canon
11(c) restrained trade "on its face," 125
 and in Goldfarb, the Court labelled the
minimum fee schedule "a classic illustration of price fixing. " 126
The Court in Professional Engineers thus squarely held that the Rule of
Reason would not be reformulated for the learned professions, and that the
professions would be held strictly accountable to the dictates of the Act, in-
cluding the per se rule for price-fixing. By so holding, the Court prevented
the dilution of the rule and a virtual resurrection of the former learned pro-
fession exemption.
B. Restatement of the Rule of Reason
1. Reassertion of Narrow Parameters
The Court's rejection of the Society's Rule of Reason argument provided
the opportunity for restating and clarifying the parameters of the Rule. In
119 435 U.S. at 692.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123
 421 U.S. at 783.
124
 Id. at 785.
126 435 U.S. at 693.
12€ 421 U.S. at 783.
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this light, the Court focused on the Society's misunderstanding of a Rule of
Reason decision in the Term immediately previous. This decision, Continental
T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 127 overruled the 1967 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co.'" decision, which held that vertical territorial sales limitations were a
per se violation of the Sherman Act.'" The GTE Court declared the Rule of
Reason to be the "prevailing standard of analysis," 1 " and expressed displea-
sure with the per se rule of illegality because of its harsh inflexibility."' The
GTE Court cautioned in a footnote, however, that Schwinn and GTE were
concerned only with vertical territorial limitations, and did not pass upon the
well-settled application of the per se rule to price-fixing.' 32
 The petitioner in
Professional Engineers, perhaps because it did not regard its practice as price-
fixing, overlooked this factor. Thus, Goldfarb and GTE were read by the
petitioner as constituting a trend toward the expansion of the Rule of Reason
with a concurrent constriction of the per se doctrine. The Court was at pains
to correct this misinterpretation in Professional Engineers, stoutly affirming that
the "reason" of the Rule refers only to a reasonable impact on competitive
conditions and nothing more. 133
The Professional Engineers Court further emphasized these narrow
parameters by examining what the Rule does not entail—any conceivable jus-
tification which could be said to be within the realm of reason. 134
 Thus, the
reasonableness of fixed prices will not be weighed, nor may it be argued that
monopolistic arrangements may better serve the public in some instances than
competition. 135
 The Court expanded its correction of the Rule's mis-
conception by emphasizing the narrowness of the test as set forth in Standard
Oil and Chicago Board of Trade.'" The test of a restraint's reasonableness
indicates one of two things—either the restraint reasonably or unreasonably
affects competitive conditions. At the outset, of course, it must be shown that
the practice, contract, or combination restrains or would tend to restrain trade
in some way. Yet, while some actual or potential impact must be shown, the
'" 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
126 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
129
 Id. at 378-79.
I " 433 U.S. at 49.
"' Id. at 50 n.16.
132
 Id. at 51 n.18.
133
 435 U.S. at 690.
134
 Id. at 688.
'3s
	 at 689. The two cases which the Court cited for this proposition are not
actually Rule of Reason cases. Both United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290 (1897), and United States v: Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898), ante-
date the Court's acceptance of the Rule of Reason in Standard Oil. In both of these
cases Justice Peckham speaking for the majority rejected adoption of a Rule of Reason
construction of the statute and held that the word "every" as in "every contract, com-
bination ... , and conspiracy" meant exactly that. 166 U.S. at 312; 171 U.S. at 559,
575-77. Notwithstanding this basis for the decision, the proposition is quite correct
even under the Rule of Reason.
138 Id. at 690-91. See text and notes at 59-71 supra.
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impact need not be great. 137 If a restraint is shown which is on its face un-
lawful, then the inquiry is ended and the restraint will be held to be con-
clusively presumed unlawful. Only when the restraint cannot categorically be
typed a per se violation is the reasonableness test called for. Although the
reasonableness test is the prevalent one in terms of frequency of use, it is still
secondary in that it is used only after a per se violation is not found. This
latter Rule of Reason test determines only whether the restraint merely regu-
lates competition in a way which actually promotes it or whether the restraint
suppresses or even destroys competition.
These limitations represent the essence of the Rule of Reason standard
set by Chicago Board of Trade, which is often lost sight of by defendants urging
the courts to apply an involved industry analysis to a challenged restraint. The
proposition from Chicago Board of Trade that "the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied ..." 138
has been misapplied by defendants as an excuse to provide a "parade of hor-
ribles" thought to be peculiar to their business."9 An additional element of
the Rule of Reason inquiry, as enunciated in Chicago Board of Trade, is the
purpose sought to be attained by the imposition of the restraint. While it has
been declared that good intent will not save an unreasonable restraint,"° the
relevance of intent has been seized upon by defendants to color their actions
as benevolent and in society's best interests, thus requiring a finding that the
restraint is reasonable.
These two errors of interpretation are to be found in Society's case. The
petitioner asserted that engineering is a unique profession and hence has
many facts peculiar to it which would justify the restraint as reasonable even
though it utterly prevented competition. As for intent, the Society argued that
its restraint was essential to the public interest and to the ethics of its profes-
sion, and that it was not adopted to enrich members of that profession. Alter-
natively, the petitioner argued that the ban on competitive bidding was a reg-
ulation of competition which actually promoted competition. The Society
maintained that bidding frustrates competition by the contractors who must
utilize the design engineer's plans when competing for the award of the proj-
ect. Therefore, the Society argued, its ban of competitive bidding among en-
gineers facilitated competition among contractors, whose charges account for
the greatest costs of new structures."' In essence, the Society was contending
" 7 See, Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 785; Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959); Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224-26 n.59.
1 " 246 U.S. at 238.
139 This use is taken out of context and ignores the test laid out in the im-
mediately preceding sentence: "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition." Id. Facts peculiar to the business is merely one element to
be considered in making the above determination.
' 4° 246 U.S. at 238.
14 ' Brief for Petitioner at 31, National Society of Professional Engineers v. Un-
ited States. The Society argued that bidding frustrates and prevents competition
among building contractors because:
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that to insist upon competitive bidding among engineers was a penny wise,
pound foolish course which would only make structures cost more in the long
run. This argument was correctly rejected by the Court. If a regulation of
competition is to be classified as promoting competition, it ought to enhance
competition among the same generic competitors. It would be too attenuated
to argue a "water mattress" theory that constriction of competition by one
part of the economy enhances competitive conditions on another part of the
economy. The affected industry analysis mandated by the Rule of Reason is
involved enough without searching the horizons for proof that some group
outside the affected industry has received a competitive impetus as a result of
a restraint of trade. Whenever presented with the invitation, the Court has
refused to countenance such a course of analysis. 142
2. Rejection of Public Safety Rationale
In essence, the petitioner's argument in Professional Engineers was that
canon 11(c) should be upheld because it was a reasonable means of prevent-
ing harm to the public. The Court stood on solid ground in rejecting this
contention, since it was not drawn to the narrow strictures of Chicago Board of
Trade. The heart of the Society's argument was that Canon 11(c) was a
reasonable restraint of competition. Because the Society so firmly _believed that
competition among engineers in pricing their services was antithetical to the
public good or the morale of the profession, it was unable to show that Canon
11(c) was a reasonable restraint of trade which actually promoted competition.
In the final analysis, there are reasonable restraints of trade and commerce,
but the Court has never found a reasonable restraint of competition. The
Society further argued that the canon was analogous to the Chicago Board of
Trade's call rule because the canon, which forbade the dissemination of price
information before the "initial tentative selection of an engineer," merely regu-
lated the timing of competition. 13
The Professional Engineers Court rejected this analogy for two reasons.
First, negotiation between a single vendee and vendor, as required by Canon
Selection of design engineers by bidding results in inadequate, incomplete,
and ambiguous plans and specifications. This, in turn, makes construction
bids non-comparable, and engenders disputes, additional construction costs
and litigation between constructors and clients. Thus, insistence on the
form of bidding in the selection of design engineers frustrates the reality
of competitive bidding in the awarding of construction contracts.
Id.
142 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609-11 (1972). There
the Court stated "Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of com-
petition in one sector of the economy against promotion in another sector is one im-
portant reason we have formulated per se rules." See also United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1936) (where the Court stated in dictum that "a merger
the effect of which 'may be substantially to lessen competition' is not saved because, on
some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed
beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial
competence ..."); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942).
143 435 U.S. 693 n.19.
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11(c), is not the equivalent of price competition by two or more potential
sellers,'" as in Chicago Board of Trade. By contrast, Justice Blackmun's con-
curring opinion in Professional Engineers accurately depicted the traditional
method called for by Canon 1 1(c) as a forced process of sequential search
which inevitably increases the costs of acquiring price information and thus
discourages vendees from generating such competition." 5 Second, the
Chicago Board of Trade Court stressed competitive impact and viewed the
Board's restraint as promoting competition since it brought more buyers and
sellers together,'" while the restraint in Professional Engineers could hardly be
viewed as promoting a competitive climate. 147 Rather, it hampered and dis-
couraged price comparison and rested on the premise that price competition
by engineers was harmful to vendees and the public at large.
Professional Engineers provides an excellent illustration of why "reason-
ableness" must be strictly limited to impact on competition, and why no con-
sideration of broadly defined reasonableness or public safety in general
should be allowed. First, as the Court correctly decided, to permit any
rhetoric of public safety to alter antitrust analysis would give rise to exceptions
to the Act for all potentially dangerous goods and services. Such exceptions
would amount to a judicial repeal of the statute since a considerable number
of goods and services are potentially harmful if mismanufactured or mis-
provided.'" Second, well-established tort principles of products liability, and
not the Sherman Act, are sufficient to protect the public from such dangers.
Creating an exception to the Sherman Act through a reasonableness test
which goes beyond competitive impact to consider safety questions seems par-
ticularly ill advised considering the existing complexity of the application of
the Rule of Reason. Moreover, if the courts were to abandon the time-
honored restrictive scope of the Rule, it would be treading on an area of
policy which is peculiarly legislative.
C. Potentially Acceptable Professional Ethical Restraints
While the Court was willing to assume that competitive bidding for en-
gineering services may be inherently imprecise and that individual purchasers
might conclude that their interest in quality and safety outweighs consider-
ations of cost savings, the Court regarded this decision as a matter of indi-
vidual choice.'" Even though these might be "reasonable" considerations, as
1 " Id.
145 Id. at 700.
145 246 U.S. at 240-41.
147 435 U.S. at 693.
145 Id. at 695.
1411 435 U.S. 694-95 n.21. Here the Court addressed petitioner's contention that
since the Brooks Act, 40 U.S.C. 541-544 (1976), and similar state statutes called For
government procurement of engineering services through the Canon 11(c) method,
that its practice could not be declared unreasonable per se. The Court quite properly
rejected this argument as well. As the Court noted, the fact that governments as indi-
vidual purchasers deem it reasonable not to seek competitive pricing does not allow
the vendor to impose that choice on others. 435 U.S. 694-95 n.21. Here the practice of
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that term is generally used, the Court stated that they could not be used by
the vendor to satisfy the Rule of Reason.' 5° The Court stressed that the
Sherman Act does not require competitive bidding, but it does prohibit un-
reasonable restraints on competition. It reiterated that the Society's ban on
competitive bidding prevented all customers from making price comparisons
and is thus an imposition of the Society's views on the costs and benefits of
competition on the entire market place. 15 ' Thus, the Court in Professional
Engineers reaffirmed the basic antitrust tenet that when a per se violation is
shown to exist, the inquiry as to legality is to cease and no amount of "reason-
ableness" will justify the restraint.
The question remains whether an ethical ban on bidding which applied
only to complex projects or unsophisticated customers might have found
favor with the Court. It would seem that so long as an ethical canon required
an engineer to refrain altogether from the practice of bidding, then the above
analysis should apply with full force. It is the vendee who must be the ulti-
mate arbiter of whether price competition is suitable for him, and not a group
of interested vendors. In the instant case, the Society's attempt to justify its
restraint under the Rule of Reason by asserting that price competition poses a
threat to public safety and professional ethics was strongly denounced as
"nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act" 152
since it substitutes the vendor's view of competition for the strongly held con-
gressional faith in competition as embodied in the Sherman Act. Thus it ap-
pears altogether unlikely that the Court would countenance a ban on competi-
tive bidding which may be partial in scope but absolute where it applies.
While the integrity of the Rule of Reason remains intact, it is submitted
that a certain variation in the competitive impact test has been effected. The
Professional Engineers Court, expressly adhering to the Goldfarb view, 153 de-
clared anew that the nature of competition in professional services may vary
from that of other business services.'" From this it appears likely that pro-
fessional competition in the Standard Oil—Chicago Board of Trade tests will not
conform to competition in the pure sense of buyers and sellers. Until recently,
the United States, as manifested through the Brooks Act, does not amount to a choice
of the government qua government, but merely as an individual consumer. In any
event, the government policy was irrelevant because petitioner's practice was conclu-
sively presumed unlawful, and hence was not open to a reasonableness test. The Court
might have drawn an appropriate parallel from Socony-Vacuum here. Recall that in that
case the petitioners sought to characterize their price-maintenance scheme as
reasonable because it was in keeping with the statutory objectives of the United States
and was knowingly tolerated by government officials. But, since the petitioners had not
obtained approval for their plan by the National Recovery Administration, they were
not shielded by the statutory antitrust exemption. 310 U.S. at 227-28. Additionally,
tolerance by government officials was dismissed by the Socony-Vacuum Court as entirely
irrelevant in a per se case. Id.
`" 435 U.S. at 694-95.
161 Id. at 695.
152 Id.
163
 435 U.S. at 696 (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17. See note 26 supra.
154 Id.
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the courts have excluded professional activities from the Sherman Act's reach,
thus ascribing but one meaning to the term "competition." Now that profes-
sional activities are seen as being within the scope of the Sherman Act, it
would be a mistake to impress on professional competition purely economic
concepts adopted by antitrust law. To say that learned professions have as-
pects of trades is not to say that they are simply trades. Vigorous solicitation
for customers and markets through price inducements and touting of oneself
may be deemed a cardinal virtue of business under the free enterprise system,
but it may still be at war with the special nature of a given profession's com-
petition. It will thus remain for the fact-finder to determine the precise na-
ture of a profession's competition, taking into account public service aspects
and the extent of state regulations.
The Court in Professional Engineers allowed flexibility for applying the
Sherman Act to the professions by means of the existing Chicago Board of
Trade model, noting that ethical norms may serve to regulate and promote
professional competition and therefore come within the Rule of Reason.'"
In the case before it, however, the Court did not consider the petitioner's
canon to be a permissible regulation of professional competition, and there-
fore the canon was overturned in its entirety. The Court, though willing to
assume that competition may conflict with ethical values, declared that this
conflict does not permit professions to do away with competition)" It is thus
clear that in the tension between the aims of the Sherman Act and the values
of the learned professions, the Court has struck a balance weighted toward
the aims of the Act. The Court has recognized in recent years what society
has long believed—that members of the learned professions are, to an extent,
pursuing trades and businesses. The Goldfarb-Professional Engineers view of the
professions' place in society is far closer to the truth than the view of Justice
Holmes that lawyers do not engage in commerce.' 57
The ethical canon in Professional Engineers was taken out of the purview of
the Rule of Reason in large part because it was an overly broad regulation of
professional competition. The Court repeated the invitation of the court of
appeals for the Society to adopt and submit to the district court another ethi-
cal guideline more closely confined to the legitimate objective of preventing
deceptively low bids for engineering services.'" It remains to be determined,
therefore, what sort of ethical guideline might be regarded as a reasonable
restraint of trade under the Rule of Reason.
IV. MODEL FOR ANALYZING PROFESSIONAL ETHICAL
REGULATIONS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Professional Self-Regulation
In the aftermath of Professional Engineers, it can be expected that profes-
sional activities which affect interstate commerce will bear increasing judicial
1"
 Id. 435 U.S. at 696.
1"
 Id.
157
 See text at note 106 supra.
158
 435 U.S. at 699.
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scrutiny. Accordingly, the courts will require analytical tools for determining
whether a restraint on competition within a profession is permissible. When a
professional association is charged with restraining trade, the court should
make a two-step inquiry to determine if the restraint can be justified as a
reasonable regulation of professional competition, even if it would be an un-
reasonable restraint of other forms of commerce. First, is there present an
identifiable professional concern which might justify the restraint and which
stands in contrast with ordinary commerce?'" If such a concern can be iso-
lated, the court should probe deeper and determine secondly if the identified
concern is the real reason for the restraint. In other words, the court should
not be satisfied by a proffered justification under an uncritical minimum ra-
tionality standard. An example drawn from the medical profession may dem-
onstrate the operation of the above suggested analysis.
If the American Medical Association takes action to control the number
of persons admitted to medical schools, then competition among physicians
will be restricted and a restraint of trade will result.' 6 ° Should an antitrust
action be brought against the Association, it might raise the defense that the
training of physicians is a proper subject of self-regulation and that stringent
standards of medical training make medicine markedly different from non-
professional commerce. While this would satisfy the first step of the inquiry, it
would still be necessary to ask if the concern for qualified physicians underlies
the restraint.
If the Association combines for the purpose of restraining the expansion
of medical schools because they would produce inadequately qualified physi-
cians or because medical schools could not expand and still have competent
faculties and adequate teaching facilities, then the restraint could be consid-
ered a reasonable regulation of medical competition. If, however, expansion
of medical education can be accomplished without sacrifice of quality, then
the above restraint might be merely intended to restrict the number of physi-
cians to maintain present "markets" just as surely as would direct quotas on
the number of physicians who may practice within a given area. If the re-
159 The importance of separating the ordinary aspects of competition from the
uniquely professional concerns can be seen by looking again to Professional Engineers
and Goldfarb. For example, the prevention of deceptive pricing policies in the en-
gineering situation might have involved ethical guidelines which required compliance
by the engineer before submitting a bid. Such regulation might have been seen by the
Court as more at the heart of the profession. Bidding among competitors, however, is
a very common business phenomenon. Since it affects the marketing of professional
services, it can be said to operate on the business aspects of the engineering profession.
In the Goldfarb lawyers' title search, the Court might have been more receptive to
ethical guidelines which required a lawyer to perform a title search with thoroughness
according to certain professional standards. Though such a guideline might exert an
upward pressure on prices, protecting consumers from the dangers of cut-rate title
searches might have been regarded as appropriate self-regulation. To standardize a
fixed price for this service, however, is patently operating on the business side of the
legal profession.
16° Compare Note, Application of Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive Activities of Physi-
cians, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 991 (1977).
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straint is shown to rest on the latter purpose, then the test will show that the
special nature of medical competition does not underlie the restraint. Accord-
ingly, the restraint will undergo antitrust analysis utilizing well-established
economic concepts.
None but the most cynical would apply to the learned professions the
observation of Adam Smith that "[pleople of the same trade seldom meet
together, even in merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."'" While
one intent of professional associations is certainly the economic betterment of
their members, it is no less true that they aim at maintaining high standards
of competence in servicing the public. Still, it is clear that the Supreme
Court's ear is growing increasingly deaf to superficial excuses of professional
dignity and the like. "Ethical considerations" alone will not serve as a talisman
to justify restraints of trade by professional groups, and courts will demand
that a restraint be closely tailored to mitigate only that which may legitimately
be mitigated.
B. The Role of State Regulation
In formulating a model for analyzing professional self-regulation, it is
important to bear in mind that many restraints of trade which operate on the
learned professions are not the work of professional associations alone, but
include regulations implemented by the states through statutes and licensing
boards."' The decision in Professional Engineers did not pass upon a profes-
sional restraint which is the result of direct state regulation; these still may be
shielded from antitrust attack by the state action doctrine. This doctrine holds
that the Sherman Act was intended to regulate private conduct and therefore
does not reach activities of the states or private practices which depend for
their authority upon the legislative command of the state as sovereign.'" In
recent pronouncements on the limits and availability of the state action
exemption,'" the Court has held that when the state is riot a party to an
antitrust action, immunity for private parties will depend on a showing of
strong state regulatory interest in the subject of the restraint" 5 as well as a
clear articulation of the state's policy in favor of the restraint.'" The first
requirement is aimed at minimizing undesirable subordination of federal an-
titrust policy to state policy. Goldfarb and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona' both
reaffirmed the long recognized state interest in regulation of the profes-
1"1 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 55 (U. Chicago Ed., 1952).
1 " See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 355 (1977).
113
 Parker v. Brown, 350 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
164
 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
105
 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 584-85 (1976).
"6
 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 594 (1976).
"1 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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sions,' 68 and therefore this requirement will often he met when a professional
group can show its restraint of trade rests on state regulation. As for the
second requirement of a definite showing of the state policy, the Court has
held that it is not enough for a private restraint of trade to be prompted
by 169 or acquiesced in 170 by the state. Thus in Goldfarb the county bar asso-
ciation's minimum fee schedule was not adopted at the behest of the Virginia
Supreme Court which regulates the legal profession in that state, and there-
fore it was not immune as state action. 171 On the other hand, the lawyer's
advertising ban in Bates was immune to antitrust attack since the Court
found it to be compelled by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was the reg-
ulator of the legal profession in that state. As such, the Court found it to be a
"clear articulation" of Arizona's policy toward regulating the profession.'"
CONCLUSION
In Professional Engineers, the Court has made clear that the Rule of
Reason is a narrow concept which will not he broadened to recreate any
learned profession exemption to the Sherman Act. The Court has made man-
ifest to the professions in particular, but to others as well, that the Rule of
Reason is of limited application, to be used solely to determine the reason-
ableness of a challenged restraint by a study of its competitive impact. The
test of reasonableness is thus an either/or test—either a restraint promotes
competition or it suppresses it. The test does not allow room for con-
siderations of public safety and professional ethics to enter the equation. Yet
the Court has made it clear that the implementation of the Rule of Reason in
the professional context will take into account the special nature of profes-
sional competition; any restraint of trade which, although regulatory, actually
promotes professional competition will probably be upheld under the Rule of
Reason.
What remains to be determined in future cases is the proper meaning to
be accorded the term "competition" in the Rule of Reason equation. It is
suggested that a division of professional competition may prove helpful in this
regard. Those aspects of a profession which are most peculiar to professional
services ought to be accorded greater flexibility when they operate incidently
as a restraint on trade, while those aspects of a profession which are akin to
ordinary business practices ought to be analyzed under the fully developed
concepts of antitrust judisprudence and thus undergo greater scrutiny. It is
hoped that in this way the Rule of Reason can provide the flexibility to recog-
nize genuine professional concerns and a certain measure of harmony can be
attained between professional ethics and competitive values.
JOSEPH L. HERN
'" Goldfarb, 421 U.S.- at 792; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 362
(1977).
' 69 Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791.
'" Cantor, 428 U.S. at 584-85.
"1 421 U.S. at 790.
"2 Id. at 362.
